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WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION ALLOWED ON BEHALF OF STILL-

BORN CHILD WHO DIES As RESULT OF PRENATAL INJURIES.

State v. Sherman (Md. 1964)
Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action alleging that the defendant's
negligence was responsible for the death of her child. The infant was stillborn after her mother had been involved in an accident while riding in the

defendant's car. This incident had taken place only a short time before
the baby was to be born. The trial court denied relief on the ground that
even though a child is viable, it must be born alive in order for there to be
an action for prenatal injuries. By a four-to-three decision' the Court of
Appeals held that an action for wrongful death caused by prenatal injuries
would lie for a viable infant regardless of whether the child was born
alive or not. 2 State v. Sherman, 198 A.2d 71 (Md. 1964).
Two cases decided over half a century ago long dominated virtually
all American jurisdictions in the area of prenatal torts. The first case,
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,3 denied recovery to a stillborn
infant for negligently inflicted prenatal injuries, while the second, Allaire
v. St. Luke's Hosp.,4 forbade compensation even when an injured child
was born alive. The former case is perhaps the more famous, but the latter
may well have been the more influential. For the Allaire court reasoned
that there could be no recovery since no duty was owed to an unborn infant
which was still considered part of its mother. This theory prevailed until
1946 when increased medical knowledge concerning the independent existence of foetii made it difficult to sustain such a concept. In a series of
cases involving negligence by an obstetrician at childbirth, the theory that
no duty was owed to a child until born was considered ludicrous. Recovery
was allowed for such malpractice in the case of Bonbrest v. Kotz.5 Thereafter the "no duty" rationale was rejected in various state courts in rapid
succession. 6 After recoveries were initially allowed in malpractice suits,
they were soon granted in all areas of negligent and intentional torts
7
causing injury to an unborn child.
Unfortunately two major restrictions were placed on these actions by
Bonbrest and subsequent cases which have continued to create difficulties
1. Henderson, J. wrote the majority opinion with the concurrence of Brune, C.J..

Hammond, J., and Sybert, J., while Gray, J., specially assgn'd, and Prescott, J., filed
dissenting opinions in which Marbury, J. concurred.
2. State v. Sherman, 198 A.2d 71 (Md. 1964).
3. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
4. 184 Ill.
359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
5. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.C. Cir. 1946). Actually Louisiana had permitted recovery
as early as 1923 in Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So.2d 352 (La. App. 1923), but the opinion
was not published until 1949.
6. For example, Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
7. The history of prenatal torts followed a curiously parallel course in the British
Commonwealth. At the turn of the century the concept of such torts was rejected in
Walker v. Great No. Ry. of Ireland, 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (1890), but the idea was later
revived, at least with respect to injuries not resulting in death, by Montreal Tramways
v. Leveille (1933) Can. Sup. Ct., 4 D.L.R. 337, which used analogies to the French
civil law as a basis for recovery.
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down to the present time.8 These restrictions were that the injured child
be viable 9 and be born alive. The reasons supporting the continuance of
these qualifications are separate and distinct and the rejection of one
restriction does not negate the usefulness of the other.10 The requirement
that the unborn child be viable has appeared in numerous cases. The instant
decision avoids the viability problem as that question was not precisely
before the court; however, the minority on the court clearly feared that
this bar would be dropped in future actions. Indeed, despite the abundance
of dicta requiring viability, the courts have refused to let it alone prevent
recovery whenever the other elements of a prenatal tort were present."
Proponents of viability propose two reasons for its continuance. The
first is that unless the child is capable of separate existence it lacks standing
as a person whom the courts can recognize and therefore grant redress
for injuries. Such an argument is discounted by medical authorities who
maintain that from the moment of conception a child is a separate being.' 2
Furthermore, the date when an infant attains independent existence cannot
13
be ascertained with certainty unless it is actually taken from its mother.
A second reason for preserving the viability requirement is the danger of
fraudulent claims and the attempt to curtail litigation. This argument,
which one encounters throughout the entire field of prenatal torts, is really
an evidentiary problem. However, since viability has now been determined
to exist somewhere between the fourth and sixth month, the entire argu14
ment could be rendered academic in all but a very few cases.
The further preservation of the viability requirement would, therefore,
seem to be pointless. The only function of such a restriction is to arbitrarily
limit litigation. Such a solution to the overcrowded docket is hardly a
desirable one. A far more difficult problem, however, is whether a child
must be born alive in order to recover. The majority in the present case
reason that, since an earlier Maryland decision' 5 had permitted an action
by a living child who had suffered prenatal injuries, the matter has been
completely settled despite the fact that at least one other jurisdiction had
made a distinction between living and dead infants in the face of decisions
very similar to that facing this court. 16
8. At least two jurisdictions have elected to preserve the Dietrich case on the
grounds that its narrow holding was simply that there could be no recovery because
the infant was not born alive. Keyes v. Constr. Serv., Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165
N.E.2d 912 (1960) ; Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
9. A viable foetus is one sufficiently developed for extra-uterine survival.
STEDMAN, MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1234 (16th ed., 1946).

10. Typical of the confusion regarding the two requirements is Gullborg v.
Rizzo, 331 F.2d 557 (3rd Cir. 1964), a recent case which reasoned that because
Pennsylvania no longer uses the viability rule, it will almost certainly reject the bornalive requirement as well.
11. Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960).
12. Comment, 110 U. PA. L. Rtv. 554 (1961).
13. For a judicial attempt to set up a table of viability, see Cooper v. Blanck, 39
So.2d 352 (La. App. 1923).
14. 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1154 (1954).
15. Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951).
16. Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
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Judge Gray's dissenting opinion advances a series of arguments for
limiting recovery to children born alive. The main thrust of his dissent,
however, is aimed at the development of this type of action under the
Wrongful Death Acts. Unfortunately this line of reasoning soon leads into
a morass of statutory interpretation and the vexing question of exactly
what the word "person" means in these acts. A succinct expression of
Judge Gray's view is that a foetus has no rights until born alive; any rights,
which an unborn child has, can be exercised only if the infant survives.
While concurring in this reasoning, Judge Prescott adds the additional
argument that statutory authority on the part of the legislature is absolutely
necessary for an action in this type of case. This point is not without
merit since actions for injuries to unborn children later born alive are
based on the common law; therefore, considerable latitude is permissible.
But since wrongful death actions are based on statutes in derogation of
the common law, they are subject to strict construction. Judge Prescott's
dissent also quotes with approval the lower court's opinion which dismissed
the action. That opinion focuses on the most important question in the
area, the question of policy. 17 The thrust of Bonbrest and later cases was
that a child should be compensated for that injury which it would have
to carry through life because of the negligence of another. The emphasis
then, is placed upon the child and his injuries, not on the parents and their
loss. However, there can be little doubt that, regardless of what reasons
are put forth, when the courts allow a wrongful death action of this kind
they are seeking to compensate the parents for the emotional loss they have
suffered. Such an attempt, while quite understandable, has proven unwieldy in the context of Wrongful Death Acts which seek to compensate
survivors for pecuniary loss. 18 Mere loss of society and companionship,
however, are classified as non-compensable.' 9 The jury, therefore, is left
with the problem of trying to make a purely speculative effort at determining the loss of earning power of a stillborn child. Meanwhile the same
jury is told to disregard the emotional loss of the parents in being denied
a child who would otherwise have been theirs.
Prior to the Bonbrest case, courts often alluded to the right of a
mother to recover for injuries and suffering because of the loss of the
child. 20 The scope of recovery in this area, however, has never been
21
fully expanded.
17. The central and crucial issue in the area of prenatal torts is one of policy,
for until an infant is born, the law can make no judgment as to its rights in this
area. The question then is, who should be compensated for any injuries and in what
manner. Del Tufo, Recovery For Prenatal Torts, 15 RUT. L. Rev. 61 (1960).
18. Cullison v. Hartman, 7 Cumb. 59, 9 D.&C.2d 359 (1956).
19. Kennedy v. Byers, 107 Ohio St. 90, 140 N.E. 630 (1923).
20. Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468 (1933).
21. One difficulty with such a solution is that the wrongful death remedy would
still be proper where a child is born alive but dies a short time later of prenatal
injuries. See Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953), where recovery
was allowed for wrongful death after a child lived only eighteen days after birth
because of prenatal injuries.
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Since the underlying purpose for permitting actions for prenatal
injuries is to make the child whole, wrongful death actions would seem
inappropriate because their sole object is to protect survivors, not to compensate for loss. A more realistic solution would be to permit a mother
to sue in her own right for the loss of her child. This would confront the
jury with the real issue in such cases, that is, what did the loss of the
child mean to the parents in terms of physical and emotional suffering.
An alternative solution might lie in a re-examination of the rationale
of wrongful death actions. This re-examination could well result'in the
22
replacement of the majority rule, that such suits are derivative in nature,
with the view that the person is suing as an agent of the legislature.23 The
parents of the injured child would sue in their own right and would be
unaffected by the disabilities of their unborn child. Such a trend could
be dangerous, however, because the use of wrongful death actions 'in this
area is far from singular in purpose. Destroying their derivative nature in
the limited area of prenatal torts could well undermine the whole concept
of wrongful death recovery in situations in which the derivative aspect
does have a beneficial effect.
In conclusion, it may be said that when a child is born alive its
prenatal injuries are always compensable.2 4 If, however, the child is
stillborn a direct action at law should be granted to the parents. There no
longer appears any basis for continuance of the vague and ineffective
viability requirement.
Malcolm J. Gross
22. Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Serv., 374 Il1. 506, 30 N.E.2d 14 (1940).
23. Breed v. Atlanta, B.&C.R. Co., 241 Ala. 640, 4 So.2d 315 (1941).
24. Accord: Musehetti v. Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc., 208 Misc. 870, 144 N.Y.S.2d
235 (1955). See also, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 677 (1960).
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